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INTRODUCTION 
From the moment Rodi Alvarado Pena married a Guatemalan 
army officer at the age of 16, she was subjected to intensive abuse, 
and all her efforts to get help were unsuccessful.  Her husband 
raped her repeatedly, attempted to abort their second child by 
kicking her in the spine, dislocated her jaw, tried to cut off her 
hands with a machete, kicked her in the vagina and used her 
head to break windows.  He terrified her by bragging about his 
power to kill innocent civilians with impunity.  Even though many 
of the attacks took place in public, police failed to help her in any 
way.  After she made out a complaint, her husband ignored three 
citations without consequence.1 
 
In 1999, the United States denied asylum to the Guatemalan 
woman who survived these torturous acts and escaped to the North 
seeking refuge.2  The panel of asylum judges in In re R-A-3 reasoned 
that Rodi Alvarado was ineligible for refugee protection because the 
abuse she suffered resulted from personal circumstances that lacked 
larger societal relevance.4 
Six years earlier, the United States denied asylum in the case of 
an Iranian woman fearing persecution for her opposition to the 
government’s restrictions on women.5  A court ruled that the woman 
did not present a particularized asylum claim because it could not 
distinguish her circumstances from Iran’s general mistreatment of 

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 1 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BROKEN BODIES, SHATTERED MINDS: TORTURE AND ILL-
TREATMENT OF WOMEN 23 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.stoptorture.org. (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2002). 
 2 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999); see also infra notes 103-07 and 
accompanying text. 
 3 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 4 See id. at 915-920. 
 5 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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women.6 
These stories illustrate the paradox faced by victims of gender 
persecution7 who seek refuge in the United States: without a category 
of asylum protection based on gender, women confront contradictory 
conceptions of their experiences as either too narrow or too broad to 
qualify them as refugees.  This Comment analyzes the unique burden 
imposed on female asylum applicants to fit their claims within this 
circumscribed notion of a refugee.  The focus of this analysis is the 
“R-A- rule,”8 an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
proposal, promulgated in direct response to the Alvarado case which 
epitomizes asylum law’s paradoxical treatment of gender-based 
asylum claims. 
At the time of this Comment’s publication, the “R-A- rule” 
remains a proposal, more than a year and a half after its initial 
proposition.9  In fact, it is possible that the INS may never adopt this 
proposed rule.10  Regardless of its ultimate fate, however, a critique of 
the “R-A- rule’s” underlying assumptions and of its contradictory 
demands on female asylum applicants serves as an important gauge 
of the INS’s perception of gender-based asylum claims at a critical 
moment.  While gender-based human rights abuses continue world-
wide,11 the United Nations, in its most definitive terms to date, has 

 6 Id. at 1243 n.12 (reasoning that “the petitioner had not shown that she and the 
other members of her group would be persecuted but only that they would be 
subjected to ‘the same restrictions and regulations applicable to the Iranian 
population in general’”) (citation omitted). 
 7 This Comment considers gender persecution, acts of violence against women 
perpetrated because of the persecutor’s bias or animus toward women.  While a 
persecutor’s motivation is a legal conclusion to be proven by an asylum applicant, 
this Comment considers rape, forced prostitution, domestic violence, female genital 
mutilation, dowry deaths, and honor killing to be prime examples of gender 
persecution.  For an enumeration and discussion of the common physical, sexual, 
and psychological forms of gender-based violence, see United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
in Refugee Situations 1, 5 U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (Mar. 2001), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “UNHCR, Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence”]. 
 8 In accordance with administrative procedure for implementing new 
regulations, the INS published the proposed rule in the Federal Register along with 
commentary explaining its purpose and reasoning.  See Asylum and Withholding 
Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
pt. 208).  In press materials announcing the proposed rule, the INS termed the 
proposal the “R-A- rule.”  See Questions and Answers, The R-A- Rule (Dec. 7, 2000), at 
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/RARule.htm (last visited Aug. 
16, 2002) (on file with author). 
 9 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597-76,598. 
 10 See Morgan, infra note 110. 
 11 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 1. 
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made clear that states should consider gender-based persecution a 
basis for asylum.12  Because of its lack of a guarantee that women 
persecuted because of their gender have equal access to refuge, the 
proposed rule exposes an enduring gender paradox in U.S. asylum 
law. 
The promulgation of the INS proposal followed two conflicting 
decisions by asylum adjudicators in the Alvarado case.  An 
immigration judge first agreed with Alvarado that she had been 
persecuted on account of her “membership in a particular social 
group,” specifically, “Guatemalan women who have been involved 
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that 
women are to live under male domination.”13  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in In re R-A-,14 however, reversed the 
judge’s decision and held that Alvarado failed to establish 
persecution based on her membership in a cognizable “social group” 
under the asylum statute.15  Alvarado appealed the decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which stayed 
the decision to allow for review by the United States Attorney 
General.16  A month before the Attorney General’s eleventh-hour 
ruling, the INS proposed the “R-A- rule” in direct response to the 
BIA’s decision in the Alvarado case.17  The INS explained its proposal 
as an attempt to clarify the interpretation of asylum cases “with more 
varied bases . . . [such as] an applicant’s gender or sexual 
orientation.”18  In one of her final acts in office, in January 2001, 
Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the BIA decision and remanded 

 12 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recently published new 
guidelines on the protection of refugee women that state, “[e]ven though gender is 
not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can 
influence or dictate, the type of persecution or harms suffered and the reasons for 
this treatment.”  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on 
International Protection: Gender Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1(A)(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 6, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (2002) [hereinafter “2002 UN Gender Guidelines”]. 
 13 Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena (Immgr. Ct. Sept. 20, 1996), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/alvarado-ij.html (on file with author). 
 14 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 15 Id. at 914. 
 16 Order of Stay in Rodi Alvarado Pena v. INS, No. 99-70823 (9th Cir. June 8, 
2000), available at http://www.uchastings.edu (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) (on file 
with author). 
 17 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 
2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).  The INS explicitly noted that the 
proposed definitions are “intended to address analytical issues that have arisen in the 
context of some claims based on domestic violence, and in particular in the Board’s 
decision in In re R-A-.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 18 Id. at 76,589. 
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the case for determination in accordance with the finalized version of 
the proposed INS rule.19 
The requirements for qualifying as a refugee consist of three 
essential elements:20 (1) an applicant must have a well-founded fear 
of persecution, which requires state action;21 (2) the applicant must 
possess one or more of five protected characteristics: race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion; and (3) the applicant must have been or will be persecuted 
on account of that characteristic.22  The proposed rule addresses the 
meaning of three particular components of the refugee definition: 
“persecution,” “on account of,” and “membership in a particular 
social group.”23 
With respect to “persecution,” the proposed rule reaffirms that 
the relevant government must be responsible for the applicant’s past 
harm and suffering, or fear of future harm or suffering.24  The 
proposed language, however, makes clear that persecution may also 
be imputed to a government when an individual or group persecutes 
an applicant and the relevant government “is unwilling or unable to 

 19 Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena, Att’y Gen. Order 2379-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001), 
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/documents/legal/ag_ra_order.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2002) (on file with author); see also Susan Sachs, Reno Voids Denial of 
Asylum for Guatemalan Battered Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at B4. 
 20 The Refugee Act defines a refugee as: 
[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 21 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597 (“Inherent in the meaning of the term persecution is 
that the serious harm or suffering that an applicant experienced or fears must be 
inflicted by the government of the country of persecution or by a person or group 
that the government is unwilling or unable to control.”). 
 22 See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 23 See 65 Fed. Reg. 76,597-76,598 (2000).  The current INS regulations do not 
provide definitions nor explanations for these terms.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 24 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597.  In addition, the proposed rule sets forth 
considerations for asylum judges to evaluate in determining whether a government is 
unable to control the persecution or whether it is unwilling to intervene.  Id.  In 
interpreting whether the government has taken any reasonable steps to control the 
conduct and whether reasonable access to state protection exists, the proposed rule 
states that judges “may” consider a list of seven sources of evidence, which include 
“government complicity” in relation to the harm, “a pattern of government 
unresponsiveness,” and “general country conditions.”  Id. 
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control” the conduct.25  With respect to the meaning of the term “on 
account of,” the rule would impose a new, higher burden, requiring 
not only that an applicant establish her persecutor’s motivation, but 
also that this motivation be central to the persecutor’s motivation to 
act.26  In addition, the rule clarifies that, although relevant, the “on 
account of” inquiry does not require evidence that a persecutor seeks 
to harm other individuals with the applicant’s protected 
characteristic.27  Ironically, the rule contradicts this clarification by 
suggesting that motive may not be ascertainable without evidence 
related to the societal significance of the abuse.28  Finally, the 
regulation proposes a two-step test for determining the meaning of 
“membership in a particular social group.”29  First, a “social group” 
must consist of members with a common, immutable characteristic.30  
Having found an immutable trait, a judge may then consider the 
extent to which the group is cohesive and societally-recognized.31 
Persecution based on one’s “membership in a particular social 
group” is the least clearly defined of the five categories of refugee 
protection.32  In spite of its ambiguity, the “social group” category is 
vital for female asylum applicants persecuted on account of their 
gender.33  Because the asylum statute does not include gender as a 
category of cognizable persecution,34 victims of gender-based 
persecution must frequently rely on the “social group” ground when 
seeking asylum.35  Thus, the contribution of the proposed INS rule to 
the analysis of gender-based claims hinges on the scope and meaning 
of persecution on account of “membership in a particular social 

 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 76,597-76,598. 
 28 See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text. 
 29 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598; see also discussion infra PART III.F. 
 30 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,598. 
 31 See infra notes 252-58. 
 32 Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations For 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Claims From Women 1 (May 26, 1995), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/guidelines_us.pdf (on file with 
author) [hereinafter “INS Guidelines”]; see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d at 1239 (3d Cir. 
1993) (discussing the sparse legislative history with respect to the meaning and scope 
of the “social group” category). 
 33 See Lydia Brashear Tiede, Battered Immigrant Women and Immigration Remedies: 
Are the Standards Too High?, 28 HUM. RTS. 21 (2001) (noting the absence of a gender-
specific category in the refugee definition and the resulting tendency of women to 
rely on the “membership in particular social group” and “political opinion” theories 
in gender-based asylum claims). 
 34 See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 35 See Brashear Tiede, supra note 33. 
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group.”36 
Although the proposed rule attempts to clarify the meaning of 
“refugee” and to improve asylum analysis for victims of domestic 
violence,37 the rule falls short of these objectives.  First, by inserting 
the new centrality requirement into the “on account of” analysis, the 
proposal adds a new hurdle into women’s difficult task of proving 
their persecutors’ motives.38  Second, rather than refining the 
interpretation of “social group,” the rule confounds its meaning by 
providing discretionary factors for judges to consider even when 
women establish persecution on account of the immutable trait of 
gender.39  In short, by failing to ensure that asylum adjudicators 
consider the persecution of women based on their gender a sufficient 
basis for asylum,40 the rule does little to improve persecuted women’s 
access to refuge.  In fact, the rule promotes the gender paradox, by 
requiring that a “social group” be more particularized than gender 
alone,41 but still possess societally significant breadth and cohesion.42 
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of gender-based 
asylum analysis in the United States, leading up to Attorney General 
Reno’s final day in office in January 2001.  Part II summarizes the 
proposed “R-A- rule” and Part III critiques it, addressing its creation 
of a more demanding standard for establishing “persecution on 
account of membership in a particular social group.”  Part IV 
evaluates the asylum paradox faced by female claimants.  This section 
argues that the United States must end the disparate treatment of 
victims of gender persecution by eliminating the contradictory view 
of women’s persecutory experiences as either too pandemic or too 
personal or domestic in nature to warrant refugee protection.  This 
Comment concludes that the most effective and appropriate manner 
of preventing the paradoxical treatment of gender-based asylum 

 36 For a discussion of the INS’s treatment of “social group” within the proposed 
“R-A- rule,” see infra PART III.F. 
 37 INS News Release, Proposed Rule Issued for Gender-Based Asylum Claims 
(Dec. 7, 2002), available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov (on file with author). 
 38 See infra PART III.D & III.E. 
 39 See infra PART III.F. 
 40 In the Federal Register summary, the INS proposal “restates that gender can 
form the basis of a particular social group.”  Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 
Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).  
However, because the rule’s proposed two-step analysis of “social group” claims 
allows judges to deny asylum in situations where a woman establishes persecution 
based on her immutable trait of gender, the Federal Register statement is merely 
aspirational.  For a discussion of the two-pronged “social group” analysis proposed by 
the INS, see infra PART III.F. 
 41 See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text. 
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claims is an amendment to the refugee statute that recognizes 
persecution on account of gender as an independent ground for 
asylum. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF GENDER PERSECUTION AS A BASIS FOR ASYLUM 
A.  The Refugee Treaty 
July 2001 marked the 50th Anniversary of the most important 
document promoting the welfare of refugees around the world:43 the 
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees.44  As of August 8, 
2002, 141 countries have become parties to this treaty45 and have 
accepted its obligations to protect refugees whose “freedom would be 
threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”46  
Although not a party to the original treaty, the United States is 
among 139 countries that have signed on to the 1967 Protocol on the 
Status of Refugees (“Protocol”).47  The Protocol incorporated the 
Refugee Convention, eliminated its temporal limitations, and 
extended its geographic coverage beyond Europe.48  It was not until 
Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980,49 which codified the 
Convention’s definition of refugee and nearly all of its other 
provisions,50 that the United States formalized a process by which 
persons could seek protection under the Protocol within the United 
States.51  Because the Refugee Convention provides the framework 
for whether foreigners seeking asylum in this country will be granted 

 43 See, e.g., Thomas David Jones, A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian 
Refugee Crises Revisited, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 480 (1995). 
 44 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
(adopted July 28, 1951), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/1951convention/index.html 
[hereinafter “Refugee Convention”]. 
 45 UNHCR, State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “State Parties to the 1951 Convention”] (on file 
with author). 
 46 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, art. 33 (1967), 
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home [hereinafter “1967 
Protocol”]. 
 47 State Parties to the 1951 Convention, supra note 45. 
 48 See 1967 Protocol, supra note 46, at arts. I(2), (3). 
 49 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107 (1980) (codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 50 Id.  The Convention’s definition of refugee is now a part of the INA and has 
been implemented by the regulations of the INS.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 
C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 51 RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2001). 
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refuge,52 to examine the treatment of women under U.S. asylum law, 
one must first look to the treaty. 
When the drafters of the Refugee Convention formulated the 
definition of refugee, they carved out five grounds under which a 
claimant could establish asylum — race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion, and membership in a particular social group — with gender 
noticeably absent.53  According to the office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), the drafters “did not 
deliberately omit persecution based on gender—it was not even 
considered.”54  While the exclusively male drafters may have 
overlooked gender primarily because the treaty’s immediate focus 
was the hundreds of thousands of European refugees displaced by 
World War II,55 the exclusion of gender has also been attributed to 
the drafters’ failure to recognize the experiences of women as 
internationally relevant.56  Specifically, the drafters failed to recognize 
that persecutors have harmed and would continue to harm women 
because of their status as women.57  After the recent horror of 
genocide in Nazi-Germany, the foremost concern of the Convention 
drafters in 1951 was the protection of persons persecuted for racial 
and religious reasons.58 

 52 See generally Binder, infra note 58. 
 53 Refugee Convention, art. 1(A)(2), supra note 44. 
 54 Judith Kumin, Gender: Persecution in the Spotlight, in 2 REFUGEES 12 (2001), 
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/ (last visited on Aug. 30, 
2002). 
 55 See UNHCR, The Refugee Convention at 50, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/ (last visited July 23, 2002) (on file with author). 
 56 See Kumin, supra note 54, at 12 (“Little thought was given to forms of 
persecution which might only affect women.”). 
 57 The fact that the male treaty drafters did not contemplate gender persecution 
in 1951 does not mean that this form of persecution was unfamiliar to the world.  For 
example, in the decade before the drafting of the Convention, Japan forced over 
200,000 Korean women into sexual slavery as euphemistically labeled “comfort 
women” during World War II.  See generally Etsuro Totsuka, Commentary on a Victory for 
“Comfort Women:”  Japan’s Judicial Recognition of Military Sexual Slavery, 8 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 47 (1999).  Furthermore, throughout history, men have perpetrated mass 
rapes of women during times of war.  See Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape as a War 
Crime: The Implications of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s 
Decision in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic on International Humanitarian 
Law, 13 FLA. J. INT’L L. 321 (2001); see also Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and 
Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 87, 88 
(1999) (calling rape during war “the accepted rule . . . in virtually all wars, by virtually 
all military forces”). 
 58 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Refuge and Resistance: Casablanca’s Lessons for Refugee 
Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 686 (1993); see also Andrea Binder, Gender and the 
“Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167, 169-70 (2001) (noting that “ideologically-based concerns 
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Thirty years after the document’s creation, however, gender-
based human rights abuses gained publicity, provoking an 
international response.59  In 1979, the United Nations (“UN”) 
enacted the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”) in an effort to address the experiences 
of women in a growing body of international human rights law, which 
had largely ignored women.60 
A decade after the UN’s passage of CEDAW, however, the 
systematic use of rape and forced impregnation during the war in 
Bosnia,61 the continuing occurrence of female genital mutilation,62 
and the brutal oppression of women under the Taliban rule of 
Afghanistan63 evidenced the unyielding prevalence of gender 
persecution in the world.  In 1991, UNHCR issued Guidelines On 
The Protection Of Refugee Women64 to ensure that victims of 
gender-persecution would be included within the protection of the 
Refugee Convention.65  Acknowledging the refugee definition as a 
potential hurdle for women seeking asylum,66 UNHCR urged state 
parties to “[p]romote acceptance in the asylum adjudication process 
of the principle that women fearing persecution or severe 

by the West about the international protection of political dissidents from Eastern 
European communist regimes” prompted the political opinion category). 
 59 Kumin, supra at 54 (“[T]he real turning point came in the 1990s . . . [when] 
the movement to recognize the universality of human rights gained credibility.”). 
 60 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. 
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force 
Sep. 3, 1981), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/index.html 
[hereinafter “CEDAW”].  The introduction to CEDAW states that “among the 
international human rights treaties, the Convention take an important place in 
bringing the female half of humanity into the focus of human rights concerns.”  Id. 
 61 For a discussion of the use of rape in war, specifically in Bosnia, and the 
importance of medically documenting mass rape, see Shana Swiss, Rape as a Crime of 
War: A Medical Perspective, 5 JAMA 612 (Aug. 4, 1993).  For an argument that rape 
during war is a form of genocide against women as a class, see Rumna Chowdhury, 
Kadic v. Karadzic — Rape as a Crime Against Women as a Class, 20 LAW & INEQ. 91 
(2002). 
 62 Jaimee K. Wellerstein, Comment, In The Name of Tradition: Eradicating the 
Harmful Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 
100 (1999) (citing World Health Organization statistics showing that at the end of 
the 1990s between 100 and 180 million women had undergone FGM). 
 63 See generally Amnesty International, Women in Afghanistan, Pawns in Men’s Power 
Struggles (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.feminst.org/afghan/sdreports.html 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2002) (on file with author). 
 64 Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women: Legal Procedures and Criteria for the 
Determination of Refugee Status, UN Doc. ES/SCP/67 ¶ 57 (1991) [hereinafter “1991 
UN Gender Guidelines”]. 
 65 Id. at ¶¶ 6, 16. 
 66 Id. at ¶ 54. 
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discrimination on the basis of their gender should be considered a 
member of a social group for the purposes of determining refugee 
status.”67 
In 1992, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women also addressed the growing number 
of gender-based human rights abuses by urging state parties to take 
deliberate steps in order to study, identify, prevent, and remedy 
violence against women. 68  One of the committee’s General 
Recommendations classified gender-based violence as a unique 
category of discrimination, noting that it “seriously inhibits women’s 
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”69 
Canada was the first country to respond to UNHCR’s call, 
adopting guidelines to facilitate the adjudication of gender-based 
asylum claims in 1993.70  Through these guidelines, Canada made 
clear that “women” may qualify as a “particular social group” under 
the Refugee Convention’s definition of refugee, which it had adopted 
as the standard for its domestic asylum laws.71  Unlike Canada, the 
United States did not readily acknowledge that gender alone may 
form the basis of a “particular social group”—a  gap that endures 
under the proposed INS rule.72 
B.  Delimiting Gender & “Social Groups” in the United States 
Prompted by the efforts of the United Nations and 

 67 Id.  The Guidelines noted that the refugee definition does not protect women 
who face severe punishment and even death for defying cultural and social norms 
that severely restrict women’s freedom, mobility, and autonomy.  Id. at ¶ 54.  In May 
2002, UNHCR went a step further, releasing updated guidelines on the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’s application to gender-related persecution, which delineate a 
substantive analysis of gender-based asylum claims within existing asylum grounds 
and directly address historical barriers to specific forms of gender-based persecution.  
See 2002 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 12. 
 68 General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38, at ¶ 1 
(1992), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomm.htm (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2002). 
 69 Id.  The Committee acknowledged that traditional views of women have led to 
the perpetration of widespread violence and coercion including, “family violence 
and abuse, forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision.”  Id. 
at ¶ 11. 
 70 Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines for Women Refugee 
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Nov. 13, 1996), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines.html#Canada (on file with author); 
see also Kumin, supra note 54. 
 71 See Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the “Domestic” 
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 392 (2001). 
 72 See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
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commentators to draw attention to the plight of persecuted women, 
in 1995 the Director of the INS Office of International Affairs 
addressed a memorandum to all Asylum Officers setting forth 
guidelines for officers to follow when adjudicating women’s asylum 
claims.73  The guidelines state that “although women applicants 
frequently present asylum claims for reasons similar to male 
applicants, they may also have had experiences that are particular to 
their gender.”74  The Guidelines declare that gender-specific abuse 
such as, “rape (including mass rape in, for example, Bosnia), sexual 
abuse and domestic violence, infanticide, and genital mutilation” 
could serve “as evidence of past persecution on account of one or 
more of the five grounds” for asylum under U.S. law.75  In spite of this 
declaration, the Guidelines do not provide substantive guidance on 
how asylum adjudicators should interpret gender-specific violence as 
a demonstration of persecution on account of one of the five other 
categories, nor on how judges could avoid stereotypes that frequently 
emerge in gender-based claims.76 
In addition, the INS carefully pointed out — both within the 
memorandum announcing the Guidelines and in subsequent 
statements — that that the Guidelines do  not expand or alter the 
legal requirements of asylum eligibility under current law.77  While 
some commentators commended the INS’s efforts for recognizing 
women’s rights to protection under refugee law,78 others criticized 
the agency for not going far enough.79  Critics noted in particular 

 73 See INS Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1. 
 74 Id. at 4. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id.; see also Diana Saso, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique 
of the 1995 INS Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 282 (1997) (arguing that the 
INS’s warning to officers not to jump to the conclusion that sexual violence against 
women is personally motivated is ineffectual because it fails to give guidance on why 
women’s gender-based claims are susceptible to this assumption and why the 
assumption is wrong). 
 77 Victims of Torture: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int’l. Relation, Subcomm. on 
Int’l. Operations and Human Rights, 104th Cong., available at 1996 WL 10164383 (May 
8, 1996) (Testimony of Phyllis A. Coven, Director of International Affairs 
Immigration and Naturalization Service).  Coven stated: “The Gender Guidelines 
provide Asylum officers with substantive guidance on the cardinal principles of 
American asylum law that bear on gender-related asylum cases . . . [but] do not 
enlarge or expand the grounds for asylum that were specified by Congress and the 
understanding the courts have reached about those grounds.”  Id. 
 78 See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 771, 778 (1995) (stating that the INS guidelines “establish the rights of women 
asylum claimants within the framework of current law and hopefully end a tradition 
of interpretation by which women have been excluded”). 
 79 See, e.g., An Mai Nguyen, Comment, The Torture Convention: A Gap Filler for the 
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that the subsequent impact of the guidelines, which are required 
reading for immigration judges but are not binding law,80 has been 
inconsistent as applied to certain forms of gender-based 
persecution.81 
As commentators have argued and the R-A- decision illustrates, a 
remaining hurdle to gaining asylum faced by victims of domestic 
violence is the continued conception of this abuse as a private wrong 
incapable of governmental redress.82  The reasoning of asylum judges 
in the cases of women who have been raped also frequently exhibits 
this view of gender-violence.83  In several cases, judges have 
determined that the sexual assault was merely an act of random 
violence, reasoning that sexual desire or some factor other than one 
of the five protected characteristics motivated the rape.84  While there 
is no one answer to the question of why men rape—a problem which 

Holes in U.S. Asylum Policy Towards Victims of Domestic Violence, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 171, 
180-81 (2000) (arguing that the Guidelines have been ineffective at improving 
adjudication of gender-based asylum claims because of the simplicity of their primary 
goal to increase sensitivity within the process, and because of the inconsistent 
application of the law in light of the guidelines’ non-binding nature); Saso, supra 
note 76, at 311 (arguing that although a positive step, “the Guidelines adopted a 
circumspect rather than an expansive approach to gender-based asylum claims”). 
 80 See 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 (June 5, 1996). 
 81 See, e.g., Elizabeth Rho-Ng, The Conscription of Asian Sex Slaves: Causes and Effects 
of U.S. Military Sex Colonialism in Thailand and the Call to Expand U.S. Asylum Law, 7 
ASIAN L.J. 103 (2000) (arguing that INS Guidelines, which recognize rape and other 
forms of sexual persecution, have been applied inconsistently—victims claiming rape 
as grounds for asylum have had success, while victims of “morally suspect” forced 
prostitution have not). 
 82 For a critique of how the conception of domestic violence as private conduct 
has led immigration judges to deny asylum claims based on a finding of a lack of 
state action, see Anker, supra note 71, at 391. 
 83 See Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J., 625, 640-41 (1993) (discussing cases that “reflect two pervasive 
problems in evaluating the asylum cases of women: difficulty accepting rape and 
other forms of sexual abuse as violence, and the tendency to ascribe personal 
motivations to persecutors when the harm is sexual”). 
 84 See, e.g., Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the 
rape of the niece of an assassinated guerilla sympathizer did not constitute 
persecution on account of political opinion but was an “act of random violence”); 
Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of 
asylum to a woman from El Salvador who had been violently raped and forced to 
watch the brutal murder of her cousins and uncle with machetes); Klawitter v. INS, 
970 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1992).  In Klawitter the Sixth Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial 
of asylum to a Polish woman who claimed that a government official “forced himself 
on her and used violence against her while threatening to destroy her career.”  Id. at 
151.  In archaic language that equates alleged abuse with attraction, and the 
perpetration of constant harassment and fear as a desire to be a “paramour,” the 
court explained that the officer’s “interest” was merely personal.  Id. at 152. 
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has produced extensive study and disagreement85—many asylum 
judges have been quick to view rape as personal and random in 
nature and therefore outside the boundaries of asylum protection.86 
In light of these barriers to gender-based asylum claims, the 1996 
BIA decision in In re Kasinga,87 which granted asylum to a woman 
from Togo by reasoning that women fearing forced female genital 
mutilation (“FGM”)88 may constitute “a particular social group,” 
elicited much enthusiasm from refugee activists and scholars.89  
Commentators hoped that in addition to setting a precedent for FGM 
cases the decision would expand protection for women seeking 
asylum based on other forms of gender-persecution.90  Other 
commentators, however, criticized Kasinga’s fact-specific 
explanation91 and questioned its potential impact on future asylum 
cases.92 

 85 For an argument that biology motivates rape, see Randy Thornhill, Symposium 
on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Part I The Biology of Human Rape, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 137 
(1999).  For an argument that rape is inherently motivated by gender animus, see 
Bonner, infra note 178 and Carney, infra note 178. 
 86 See, e.g., Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152; see also Kelly, supra note 83. 
 87 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).  The BIA described the FGM 
procedure that Kasinga would be forced to endure as an extreme form in which 
portions of the female genitalia would be cut away with knives causing extensive 
bleeding, severe pain, several weeks of incapacitation, and serious risk of life-
threatening complications.  Id. at 361. 
 88 FGM is a “medically unnecessary” procedure, which is endured by 80 to 110 
million women worldwide and practiced in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and 
Muslim parts of Asia.  Female Genital Mutilation, JAMA (Dec. 6, 1995).  FGM is 
considered a right of passage within some cultures and typically occurs at the age of 
seven, but causes women severe medical complications for the rest of their lives.  Id. 
 89 See, e.g., Connie M. Ericson, In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Grounds for Asylum 
for Women, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 671 (1998); Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female 
Genital Mutilation as Ground for Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In Re 
Fauziya Kasinga and Prospects for More Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 375 (1997); Tiajuana Jones-Bibbs, United States Follows Canadian Lead and 
Takes an Unequivocal Position Against Female Genital Mutilation: In re Fauziya Kasinga, 4 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 275 (1997) (calling the decision a “courageous position” 
which will serve as “precedent [to] guide 179 immigration judges in adjudicating like 
claims by women fleeing FGM”); Karen Musalo, In re Kasinga: A Big Step Forward for 
Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 853 (July 1, 1996); Mary M. 
Sheridan, Comment, In re Fauziya Kasinga: The United States Has Opened Its Doors to 
Victims of Female Genital Mutilation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 433 (1997). 
 90 See, e.g., Helton & Nicoll, supra note 89; Musalo, supra note 89. 
 91 The BIA reasoned that Kasinga had a well-founded fear of persecution as a 
“member of social group consisting of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
Tribe who have not had FGM as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.”  Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. 
 92 See, e.g., James A. Lazarus, In Through the Side Door: Analyzing In Re Anikwata 
Under U.S. Asylum Law and the Torture Convention, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 101, 114 
(2000) (Kasinga “did not reach much beyond the facts of that particular case”); 
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Two recent and inconsistent immigration decisions may 
illustrate a basis for this criticism.  In the context of the trafficking of 
women, an immigration judge relied on Kasinga to grant asylum to a 
woman facing forced prostitution in China.93  Another immigration 
judge, however, found the “social group” argument unpersuasive in 
the case of a Russian woman who was sold into sexual slavery and 
endured daily rape and severe abuse by her captor.94  Even after 
Kasinga’s recognition that women may be persecuted as members of 
social groups at least partly defined by gender, some immigration 
judges continued to demonstrate an unwillingness to build upon 
Kasinga’s reasoning and to extend protection to other persecuted 
women.95  Three years after this important decision, however, in the 
views of many refugee activists and scholars, gender-based asylum law 
took an abrupt step backward.96  On June 11, 1999, the BIA issued its 
decision in one of the most extreme cases of domestic violence 
imaginable:97 In re R-A-.98 

Linda A. Malone, Beyond Bosnia and In Re Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent 
Developments in Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 319, 336-37 
(1996) (arguing that the “door to asylum may remain closed to many applicants 
without the representation, documentation, and extraordinarily compelling facts 
available to [Kasinga]”). 
 93 Matter of J-M-, 1, 16 (Immgr. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (reasoning that the applicant’s 
objection to forced prostitution put her in “the same situation as the applicant in 
Kasinga, who was in a society where she was being forced to undergo a procedure of 
which she was a not in agreement”), at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/364. 
 94 Gender Asylum Case Study 275, provided by the University of California, 
Hastings College of Law Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/200-299/summary275.html (on file with 
author).  The immigration judge rejected all of the applicant’s asserted social group 
theories, including one that described her membership in a particular social group 
as “young women who refuse to consent to sex.”  Id. 
 95 See, e.g., Gender Asylum Case Study 216, provided by the University of 
California, Hastings College of Law Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/200-299/summary216.html (denying asylum 
to a young woman kidnapped, raped, beaten and forced to work in a brothel on 
grounds that sexual slavery is not a form of persecution addressed by asylum law); 
Matter of G-R-, (Immgr. Ct. Jan. 26, 1995), at http://www.uchastings.edu (on file with 
author). 
 96 See infra note 107. 
 97 The BIA decision recounts almost three pages of horrific abuse suffered by 
Alvarado at the hands of her husband.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10 (B.I.A. 
1999); see also Hannah R. Shapiro, The Future of Spousal Abuse as a Gender-Based Asylum 
Claim: The Implications of the Recent Case of Matter of R-A-, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
463, 487 (2000) (quoting a National Public Radio interview, in which Karen Musalo, 
Director of the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies stated that if asylum “can’t be 
granted in a case where a woman is basically tortured by her husband over a ten-year 
period—if in a case like this, there’s no protection, my God, in what cases would a 
woman be protected?”). 
 98 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908-10 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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In her asylum application, Rodi Alvarado presented two theories 
to establish her status as a refugee.99  First, Alvarado reasoned that 
her husband persecuted her on account of her political opinion, 
defined as her opposition to male domination.100  Alternatively, 
Alvarado argued that he persecuted her on account of her 
membership in a particular social group, specifically “Guatemalan 
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male 
companions, who believe that women are to live under male 
domination.”101  The immigration judge who initially heard the case 
agreed that Alvarado’s husband persecuted her both on account of 
her membership in the asserted social group and because of her 
imputed political opinion, and accordingly granted asylum.102  On 
appeal by the INS, the BIA rejected this reasoning, stating that “the 
group identified by the immigration judge has not adequately been 
shown to be a ‘particular social group’ for asylum purposes.”103  
According to the BIA, Alvarado “failed to show that her husband was 
motivated to harm her, even in part, because of her membership in a 
particular social group or because of an actual or imputed political 
opinion.”104  In fact, the BIA seemed to suggest that Alvarado suffered 
violence that had no purpose or motivation whatsoever,105 and that 
she was simply cursed by marrying an evil man.106  The decision 
engendered widespread criticism and sparked renewed attention to 
the lack of protection afforded to persecuted women under U.S. 
asylum law.107 
When Attorney General Janet Reno vacated the decision on 
January 18, 2001, she remanded the case to the BIA for 

 99 Id. at 911. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Matter of Rodi Alvarado Pena (Immgr. Ct. Sept. 20, 1996), available at 
http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/caselaw/ij/alvarado-ij.html. 
 103 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 915 (“As their marriage proceeded, the level and frequency of his rage 
increased concomitantly with the seeming senselessness and irrationality of his 
motives.”). 
 106 See id.  The BIA explained that “once having entered into this marriage, there 
was nothing the respondent could have done or thought that would have spared her 
(or indeed would have spared any other woman unfortunate enough to have 
married him) from the violence he inflicted.”  Id. 
 107 See, e.g., Lindsay A. Franke, Note, Not Meeting the Standard: U.S. Asylum Law and 
Gender-Related Claims, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2000); Shapiro, supra note 97; 
Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 238 (2000); Frederic Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied 
Asylum, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at A1. 
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reconsideration in accordance with the proposed INS rule, stating 
that the case should not be decided until the new regulations were in 
final form.108  Although the proposal received an answer and 
comment period, under the Bush Administration, the INS has not 
finalized any changes to the asylum regulations,109 and Rodi Alvarado 
waits.110 
II.  THE INS PROPOSAL 
The proposed rule provides guidance on the interpretation of 
three critical terms embodied in the definition of refugee: 
“persecution,” “on account of,” and “membership in a particular 
social group.”111  These three terms have each produced analytical 
barriers in asylum claims brought by women, particularly in cases in 
which the persecutor is a non-state actor or in which the persecution 
is deemed to occur in the “private sphere, outside both the realm of 
recognized civil and political activity and the reach of the state”112 
The rule first explains that “persecution” is “serious harm or 
suffering” measured by both the applicant’s subjective experience 
and by an objective standard.113  In addition, the “persecution” must 
be inflicted by the government from which a refugee has fled or by a 

 108 See In re: Matter of Rodi Avlarado Pena, Att’y Gen. Order 2379-2001 (Jan. 19, 
2001). 
 109 See generally Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76, 588 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 110 At least one refugee activist has expressed concern that the new rules may 
never appear under the Bush Administration.  See Fiona Morgan, The Politics of 
Protection, at http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2001/01/09/asylum/ (Jan. 9, 
2001) (quoting Alvarado’s lawyer and refugee activist Karen Musalo’s statement that  
“[i]t is not unusual at all for the incoming new administration to yank all of the 
regulations or other pending matters that have not been finalized”) (last visited Sept. 
1, 2002) (on file with author).  Even if the Bush administration does adopt the 
proposed rule, it could be some time before the rule is finalized and binding.  In the 
case of INS regulations implementing the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act, although more comprehensive, it took four years from 
the time the INS proposed the rules in January 1997 until the agency finalized them 
in December 2000.  Phillip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2001). 
 111 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597-76,598. 
 112 Dorothy A. Thomas, Acting Unnaturally: In Defense of the Civil and Political Rights 
of Women, in FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS 41, 42 (Margaret A. Schuler ed., 
1995) (noting that women have been excluded from human rights protection 
because of the “relegation [of women] to the private sphere”); see also Emily Love, 
Equality in Political Asylum Law: For a Legislative Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution, 
17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 137 (1994) (noting that “distinctions between the 
predominantly male-dominated public sphere and the female-dominated domestic 
sphere can lead to the denial of [women’s] asylum claims”). 
 113 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,597. 
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“person or group that that government is unwilling or unable to 
control.”114 
Turning to the “on account of” definition, the rule states that 
when a persecutor has “mixed motivations,” an applicant must prove 
that her “protected characteristic is central to the persecutor’s motive 
to act against [her].”115  Although all asylum applicants have the 
burden of proving motive to satisfy the asylum statute’s “on account 
of” requirement,116 the proposal would alter the current analysis by 
adding an inquiry into the centrality of the motive. 
With respect to the “on account of” analysis, the INS rule 
attempts to limit a principal aspect of the “on account of” reasoning 
in the R-A- case: the BIA’s determination that Alvarado’s husband 
could not have harmed her on account of her “membership in a 
particular social group” because he did not target other women 
sharing his wife’s “social group” characteristic.117  Rejecting the BIA’s 
reasoning, the INS clarifies that evidence that a person acts against 
other members of an asserted social group is relevant, but not 
required to establish motive.118  In the rule’s summary, the INS 
recognizes that a persecutor could potentially target an individual 
precisely because of a specific characteristic, yet not attempt to harm 
others possessing the same characteristic.119  According to the INS, 
this may be the case in the context of domestic violence, in which 
social structures, such as a woman’s inferior status in a relationship, 
can enable a persecutor to harm only one woman, the woman in a 
domestic relationship with the abuser. 120 

 114 Id.  The proposed rule sets forth considerations for asylum judges to evaluate 
in determining whether a government is unable to control the persecution or 
whether it is unwilling to intervene.  Id.  In interpreting whether the government has 
taken any reasonable steps to control the conduct, and whether reasonable access to 
state protection exists, the rule states that judges “may” consider a list of seven 
sources of evidence, which include “government complicity” in relation to the harm, 
“a pattern of government unresponsiveness,” and “general country conditions.”  Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 117 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592.  The INS explained that an “important factor in the 
Board’s decision” was the fact that “there was no evidence that [Alvarado’s husband] 
would seek to harm other women who live with other abusive partners.”  Id. 
 118 Id. at 76,598. 
 119 Id. at 76,592-76,593.  The INS offered the example of a society in which 
members of one race hold members of another race in slavery.  Id. at 76,593.  Noting 
that if a slave owner beats his own slave but does not beat his neighbor’s slave, it 
would still be reasonable to conclude that the victim’s race was the primary impetus 
for the persecution.  Id. 
 120 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592-76,593.  The INS noted that some of the other women 
in society who share this characteristic for which the victim is being harmed may be 
at risk of harm from their own partners on account of the same reasons.  Id. 
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In fact, the proposed rule stresses that applicants may rely on 
circumstantial evidence demonstrating “patterns of violence in the 
society against individuals similarly situated to the applicant” in order 
to establish motive.121  The INS reasons that this evidence may reflect 
a country’s societal norms and demonstrate the relevant legal 
system’s support for the persecutory conduct.122  According to the 
INS, this societal context may help reveal an abuser’s belief that he 
possesses the authority to batter and control his victim “on account 
of” her inferior position in the relationship.123 
Finally, the rule attempts to clarify the divergent interpretations 
of “membership in a particular social group” articulated by the 
various circuit courts.124  In the summary to the proposed rule, the 
drafters first acknowledge the scant judicial and administrative 
interpretation defining what “is perhaps the most complex and 
difficult to understand” of the five categories of asylum.125  The INS 
notes that under the Matter of Acosta analysis, the primary BIA 
decision interpreting this term, “membership in a particular social 
group,” requires that group members share a “common, immutable” 
trait.126  According to the INS, the proposed rule codifies the Acosta 
approach by requiring that a social group consist of  “members who 
share a common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship 
ties, or past experience, that a member either cannot change or that 
is so fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that 
he or she should not be required to change it.”127  Although the INS 
acknowledges that gender clearly meets this requirement,128 the 
agency’s proposed analysis does not end there.  In addition to an 
immutable characteristic, the rule enumerates several factors that 
may be considered in determining whether a “particular social 
group” exists: 
(i) the members of the group are closely affiliated with each 
other; (ii) the members are driven by a common motive or 
interest; (iii) a voluntary associational relationship exists among 
the members; (iv) the group is recognized to be a societal faction 

 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 76,593. 
 124 For a discussion of the different interpretations of  “social group” employed by 
the various circuit courts, as well as the BIA, see B.J. Chisholm, Comment, Credible 
Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law’s Treatment of Gender-Related Claims, 44 HOW. 
L.J. 427, 439-43 (2001). 
 125 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593-76,595. 
 126 Id. at 76,589. 
 127 Id. at 76,598. 
 128 Id. 
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or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population in the 
country in question; (v) members view themselves as members of 
the group; and (vi) the society in which the group exists 
distinguishes members of the group for different treatment or 
status than is accorded to other members of society.129 
Part III.E addresses how consideration of these additional factors 
after an applicant has already established persecution based on an 
immutable characteristic allows judges to continue the paradoxical 
treatment of gender-based claims. 
III.  THE “R-A- RULE” OLD AND NEW HURDLES FOR WOMEN SEEKING 
ASYLUM 
A.  Constructing a Societal Focus in the Nexus Analysis 
When the United States Supreme Court made clear in INS v. 
Elias-Zacarias130 that an asylum applicant must demonstrate 
persecution on account of her protected characteristic, it set a 
baseline requirement that she proffer some evidence — whether in 
direct or circumstantial form — showing that the characteristic 
motivated the persecution.131  The Court, however, did not quantify 
the extent of the evidence required, nor did it explain how the 
evidence might vary when applied to the various forms of 
persecution.132  The proposed rule and its commentary are consistent 
with Elias-Zacarias in recognizing that in some instances 
circumstantial evidence, such as patterns of abuse in the relevant 
community or the inferior status of women in domestic relationships, 
may meet the baseline requirement of proof.133  In addition, however, 
to discussing the evidentiary role of societal information in “social 

 129 Id. 
 130 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 131 Id. at 482. 
 132 Id. at 483.  In fact, the Court directly stated that a claimant need not provide 
“direct proof of his persecutors’ motives.”  Id.  Several scholars have convincingly 
criticized Elias-Zacarias and the overemphasis and misinterpretation of the nexus 
requirement in asylum jurisprudence.  Id. at 483.  In fact, the Court directly stated 
that a claimant need not provide “direct proof of his persecutors’ motives.”  Id.  
Several scholars have convincingly criticized Elias-Zacarias and the overemphasis and 
misinterpretation of the nexus requirement in asylum jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Karen 
Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences?: Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 
15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179 (1994).  Musalo argues that “the overarching objective of 
the domestic and international refugee regime is protection of potential victims of 
persecution, not punishment of persecutors.”  “In this context,” Musalo argues, “the 
inquiry should be on the effect of persecution on the victim and not on the intent of 
the persecutor.”  Id. at 1181-82. 
 133 See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. 
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group” claims, the INS should have followed the reasoning of the 
dissent in the R-A- case and emphasized that factual circumstances 
relating to the nature and context of the persecution may be the 
primary indicator of motive in asylum cases.134  By not discussing the 
importance of this evidence in establishing motive, the INS failed to 
fully resolve the flaws of the R-A- analysis, specifically, the BIA’s 
egregious disregard of the nature and circumstances of the domestic 
violence in the “on account of” inquiry.135 
Contrary to the INS’s assumption that direct evidence of 
persecution is always considered,136 in the R-A- case, the BIA failed to 
appreciate the husband’s stated desire to perpetuate his wife’s 
submissive role, his use of violence when Alvarado was pregnant, and 
the severe abuse directed at his wife’s genitalia137—all powerfully 
indicative of motive.138  The nature of the abuse when Alvarado was 

 134 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 938 (B.I.A. 1999) (dissenting opinion) 
(“First, to assess motivation, it is appropriate to consider the factual circumstances 
surrounding the violence.”). 
 135 Within the BIA’s discussion of nexus there is a noticeably absent consideration 
of the sexual and gender-specific nature of the abuse, including the husband’s sexist 
statements.  See id. at 920-23. 
 136 See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (2000) 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (“As in any asylum or 
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and actions will be 
considered.”). 
 137 See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908. 
The respondent’s husband raped her repeatedly.  He would beat her 
before and during the unwanted sex.  When the respondent resisted, 
he would accuse her of seeing other men and threaten her with death.  
The rapes occurred “almost daily,” and they caused her severe pain.  
He passed on a sexually transmitted disease to the respondent from his 
sexual relations outside their marriage.  Once, he kicked the 
respondent in her genitalia, apparently for no reason, causing the 
respondent to bleed severely for 8 days.  The respondent experienced 
the most severe pain, when he forcefully sodomized her.  When she 
protested, he responded, as he often did, “You’re my woman, you do 
what I say. 
Id. 
 138 Compare with Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (1998), a Washington federal 
district court case discussed in Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for 
Gender-Based Bias Crimes – Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 265, 273 (2000).  In Ziegler, the court found evidence of gender bias, based 
on allegations of rape, gender-specific epithets, and acts promoting stereotypes of 
women’s submissive roles.  Id.  Although Ziegler was a VAWA Civil Rights Remedy 
claim and not an asylum case, in determining that the persecutor was motivated by 
gender bias, the court looked to similar forms of evidence available in the R-A- 
record, but which the BIA ignored.  R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908.  “The [Ziegler] 
court relied on evidence of severe and excessive attacks on the plaintiff, especially 
during her pregnancy, and allegations that the violence was often without 
provocation and specifically at times when the plaintiff asserted her independence.”  
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pregnant is particularly revealing of motive because it occurred in 
reaction to Alvarado’s possession of reproductive attributes shared by 
women.  For example, her husband dislocated Alvarado’s jaw when 
her menstrual period was late and kicked her “violently” in the spine 
“when she refused to abort her 3- to 4- month old fetus.”139  One 
could conceivably construe the husband’s motivation narrowly as his 
anger over the conception of an unwanted child and thereby — in 
the words of one commentator — “privilege the viewpoint of the 
immediate oppressor.”140  That argument, however, does not mitigate 
the fact that Rodi Alvarado was attacked because she was pregnant, 
something largely beyond her control and innate to her status as a 
woman.141  The husband’s brutal actions also manifest his desire to 
physically control his wife’s body and decisions—further evidence 
bearing on his view of his wife’s subordinate status.142 
In its failure to respond to the BIA’s blatant dismissal of 
evidence related to the nature and circumstances of the abuse in the 
R-A- case, the rule makes a subtle endorsement of the omission.  In 
less subtle terms, the rule suggests that without evidence of societal 
patterns of abuse, an abuser’s motive may not be ascertainable.143  
Judges, however, have explicitly rejected this notion in other asylum 
contexts.144  To satisfy the “on account of” burden of an asylum claim, 
applicants only have to establish facts related to their own 
persecution, not the persecution of others.145  Ironically, the INS 
attempted to avoid this suggestion in a slightly different context 

Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra, at 273. 
 139 R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908. 
 140 Chisholm, supra note 124, at 430 (criticizing asylum law’s tendency to construe 
an applicant’s experience solely from the persecutor’s perspective and for “imposing 
its understanding of the applicant’s experience” in the asylum analysis). 
 141 Compare Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 (finding the severity of a husband’s 
attacks on his wife during her pregnancy revealing of gender motivation).  For a 
clinical discussion of the problem of abuse during pregnancy, see Andrew J. Satin et 
al., Sexual Assault in Pregnancy, in 77 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 710 (noting that 
“[t]he frequency and severity of domestic violence against pregnant women have 
been shown to be increased, and the pregnant abdomen tends to be the primary site 
of physical attack against this group”). 
 142 See supra notes 137 & 139 and accompanying text. 
 143 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (proposed 
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (stating that societal patterns of 
abuse may be helpful to establishing a “prevalent belief within society . . . that cannot 
be deduced simply by evidence of random acts”). 
 144 See, e.g., Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting in an 
asylum case based on a “political opinion” claim that an applicant only has the 
burden of proving his own persecution and does not have to establish that other 
members of society were persecuted as well). 
 145 See Makonnen, 44 F.3d at 1378. 
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within the proposed “R-A- rule.”  It rejected the BIA’s interpretation 
of the “on account of” analysis to require a showing that Alvarado’s 
husband persecuted women in addition to his wife.146  In spite of this 
rejection of a societal focus with respect to an individual actor’s 
victims, the “R-A- rule” adopts the BIA’s reasoning in the Alvarado 
case to the extent it insists that a private actor’s motive be evaluated 
in a societal context.147 
In R-A-, the BIA repeatedly focused on what the Board 
considered the violence’s lack of societal relevance.148  For example, 
in the discussion of social group, the BIA gave weight to the 
unfounded conclusion that in order for Alvarado’s social group 
theory to work “the characteristic of being abused [must be] 
important within Guatemalan society.”149  The BIA was also troubled 
by its belief that Guatemalan society did not perceive the asserted 
group as a societal faction.150  The “R-A- rule” properly refused to 
impose a legal requirement that an asylum applicant show that her 
persecutor seeks to harm other members of her asserted social 
group.151  The proposed rule’s inapposite statement, however, that 
societal patterns of abuse may be necessary to establish a “prevalent 
belief within society . . . that cannot be deduced simply by random 
acts”152 undermines this limitation.  The suggestion that domestic 
violence may be a random act or crime perpetuates a view of non-
state actor violence as societally insignificant and beyond the reach of 
asylum.153  In this respect alone, the proposed “R-A- rule” is a sizeable 
step backward. 
As the dissenting opinion in the R-A- decision suggests, the BIA 
could have found a nexus between the persecution Alvarado suffered 
and her membership in the asserted group without evaluating the 
patriarchal social structure and patterns of domestic abuse in 
Guatemala.154  The dissent set forth four factors — largely focusing 

 146 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592-76,593. 
 147 See supra note 143. 
 148 See Chisholm, supra note 124. 
 149 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 150 Id. at 918. 
 151 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,592 (2000) 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 152 Id. at 76,593. 
 153 For a critique of the legal view of women’s persecution as occurring in the 
domestic sphere, see Thomas, supra 112. 
 154 Addressing the factual record alone, the R-A- dissent noted that the facts 
“reflect quite clearly that the severe beatings were directed at the respondent by her 
husband to dominate and subdue her, precisely because of her gender.”  R-A-, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. at 938. 
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on the nature and circumstances of the violence — for evaluating the 
nexus between an applicant’s suffered abuse and the persecutor’s 
motivations: (1) the factual circumstances of the violence, (2) the 
incomprehensibleness of the actions as an inference that the 
persecutor acted on account of the victim’s possession of a protected 
characteristic, (3) the reason why such violence occurs, (4) and the 
extent to which the persecutor acted with impunity.155  One 
commentator, echoing the approach of the R-A- dissent noted, 
[T]he record plainly shows that Alvarado-Pena’s husband beat 
her in order to subdue and control her, and further that he did so 
because of her gender, as is evidenced by the repeated abuse 
directed at her vagina, his attempt to abort her pregnancy, and 
the rapes.  Additionally it is clear that he harmed her on account 
of her gender because of his repeated reminder “[y]ou are my 
woman, you do what I say.”156 
By failing to take issue with the BIA’s refusal to value this direct 
evidence, the INS contradicts its assertion that “[a]s in any asylum or 
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and 
actions will be considered.”157  In the context of gender-persecution, 
the INS tacitly rejects the primacy of evidence relating to the factual 
circumstances of the persecution in the “on account of” inquiry.158 
B.  The Floodgates Are Strong 
The INS and asylum adjudicators must not ignore the value of 
direct evidence in the motive inquiry out of fear it will create an 
asylum regime that allows every victim of rape or domestic violence to 
qualify as a refugee.159  The asylum framework already provides an 
assurance against this slippery slope scenario because the asylum 
statute only provides refuge to victims of rape or domestic violence 
when the abuse rises to the level of “persecution”—meaning severe 
harm or suffering occurring because of state action or by a private-

 155 Id. 
 156 See Franke, supra note 107, at 619 (citing In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 at 938-39 
(B.I.A. 1999)). 
 157 See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 (2000) 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 158 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906; see also Goldscheid, infra note 181 (discussing 
how evidence of the nature and circumstances of violence can reveal gender-bias). 
 159 See John Linarelli, Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process, 60 ALB. L. REV. 
977, 984-85 (1997) (refuting the floodgates argument by noting other stringent 
practical and legal barriers facing women seeking asylum); see also Helton & Nicoll, 
supra note 89, at 387 (noting that the experience of Canada, which recognizes 
persecution based on gender as sufficient for membership in a particular social 
group undermines the floodgates argument). 
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actor that a “government is unwilling or unable to control.”160  In 
addition to showing motive, establishing “persecution” is a separate 
burden that every asylum applicant must meet.161  When Congress 
enacted the Refugee Act, it set the requirements for obtaining asylum 
and with them the safeguards against a flood of refugees.162  Asylum 
judges thus exceed their adjudicatory role and undermine 
Congressional intent when they ignore evidence bearing on an 
element of asylum because of presuppositions about potential surges 
in the refugee stream. 
Asylum adjudicators also contravene the Refugee Act by 
conflating the requirements of several asylum elements into a single 
analysis.  For example, in R-A-, the BIA strikingly confused its analysis 
of the husband’s motivation with the analysis of whether Guatemala’s 
tolerated his conduct—treating the latter as a step in determining the 
former.163  Instead of treating the inquiry into the private actor’s 
motive and whether the conduct rose to the level of persecution 
because of the state’s conduct as separate elements, the BIA fused the 
two inquiries into one.164  As a result, the BIA refused to find that 
Alvarado’s husband had persecutory motives because it did not find 
Guatemala culpable for failing to protect Alvarado.165  Guatemala’s 
alleged remedial efforts to address spousal abuse fueled the BIA’s 
hesitancy to find that the husband had persecutory motives.166 
This analysis is problematic because a private actor’s motive 
often has nothing to do with what a country is doing at large.  
Furthermore, Guatemala’s failure to protect Alvarado, although 
sufficient for a finding of “persecution,” may seem less culpable when 
analyzed under the motive inquiry—which necessarily focuses on 
deliberate actions, and in the asylum context, animus.  Guatemala’s 
failure to protect Alvarado, however, can be a basis for finding 
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 160 See Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
state action or a showing that a country is unwilling or unable to control persecution 
by a private individual satisfies the Refugee Act). 
 161 Id. 
 162 P.L. 96-212, Refugee Act of 1980 Senate Report No. 96-256 (July 23, 1979) 
(stating that the Refugee Act “provides for the first time the statutory requirements . . 
. and defines and exerts congressional control over the process”). 
 163 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 922.  The BIA noted that because “some 
measures [had] been pursued in an attempt to respond” to domestic violence in 
Guatemala, it was “not convinced that the absence of an effective governmental 
reaction to the respondent’s abuse translates into a finding that her husband 
inflicted the abuse because she was a member of a particular social group.”  Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
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“persecution” if either the state acted — or failed to act — because of 
gender animus or if it was simply impotent to protect women.167  As 
the R-A- rule emphasizes, “[i]nherent in the meaning of the term 
persecution is that the serious harm or suffering that an applicant 
experienced or fears must be inflicted by the government of the 
country of persecution or by a person or group that the government 
is unwilling or unable to control.”168  Not only is this manipulation of 
the asylum framework analytically problematic, but it allows for unfair 
results.  It encourages judges to ignore private-actor persecution if it 
finds a lack of state-animus or some evidence of a country’s remedial 
measures.169 
While an ultimate determination about a person’s eligibility for 
asylum may necessarily reflect conditions for women in a particular 
country by virtue of a lack of state protection or the frequency of a 
particular practice,170 the asylum framework must not conflate this 
information with the evaluation of motive at the expense of direct 
evidence of a private actor’s gender animus.171  By putting state 
conduct in the spotlight while evaluating private motive, the BIA 
pushes private actor persecution back into the “domestic sphere.”  In 
doing so, the opinion reinforces a perspective rejected by 
international law: that domestic and intimate abuses suffered by 
women are irrelevant to human rights norms.172 
In addition to statutory safeguards that exist against a flood of 
refugees, not every domestic violence case will present strong direct 
evidence bearing on a persecutor’s motive; the availability and quality 
of evidence will vary in every case.173  Therefore, unlike a per se rule 
governing the motive inquiry in gender-specific abuse cases,174 
evaluating direct evidence will not automatically equal a find of 
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 167 65 Fed. Reg. 76,597. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 922. 
 170 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding that 
applicant had well-founded fear of persecution based on her membership in a 
particular social group, and that her fear of persecution was country-wide). 
 171 See Khan, infra note 175. 
 172 See Setareh, infra note 293 
 173 See Malone, supra note 92 (noting that the “door to asylum may remain closed 
to many applicants without the representation, documentation, and extraordinarily 
compelling facts available to [Kasinga].”). 
 174 While a per se rule governing the motive inquiry for certain forms of gender-
persecution is analytically sound, see infra note 178, because it is unfeasible that the 
INS would ever accept this standard given its well-established concern about opening 
the door too widely to gender-based claims, see supra note 77, this comment 
addresses the practical and does not evaluate the debate at length. 
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persecution on account of gender. 
On the other hand, if a fair evaluation of the evidence in the 
cases of all victims of domestic violence seeking asylum from a 
particular country results in a determination that the persecutor in 
each case acted on account of the person’s gender, then that 
conclusion should be honored, not avoided.  To ignore this evidence 
would create an asylum adjudication regime that inappropriately 
worries more about the number and types of refugees entering the 
country rather than accurate and fair interpretation of its governing 
statute.175  Moreover, even if this hypothetical were a reality, because 
of the practical barriers facing female asylum-seekers, such as 
economic factors and the physical inability to escape repressive 
conditions,176 a wave of refugees is unlikely.177 
While these barriers to gaining asylum may provide some 
reinforcement to the floodgates and assuage the INS’s apparent 
weariness about allowing direct evidence of persecution to prove too 
much,178 the number and quality of the safeguards limiting the 
amount of successful asylum applications should be irrelevant to the 
question of motive.  To preserve the integrity of the asylum process 
and fair interpretation of the Refugee Act, the INS should ensure 
that full weight be given to direct evidence of motive.  The INS 
should require asylum adjudicators to look squarely at available 
evidence that demonstrates gender-targeted and specific abuse, 
gender-permeated invectives, and persecutors’ stated desires to 
oppress or control women.179 
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 175 For an argument that the United States justifies the number of refugees it 
admits based on national interest as opposed to humanitarian concerns, see Rex D. 
Khan, Why Refugee Status Should be Beyond Judicial Review, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 57, 72-73 
(2000). 
 176 See infra notes 328-29 and accompanying text. 
 177 See commentary refuting the floodgates argument, supra note 159. 
 178 The INS’ erection of new barriers in the asylum process may reveal its 
weariness of the idea that some forms of gender-based violence would create a 
slippery slope because they are inherently gender-motivated, a position persuasively 
articulated by several scholars.  See, e.g., Rebekka S. Bonner, Note, Reconceptualizing 
Vawa’s “Animus” for Rape in States’ Emerging Post- Vawa Civil Rights Legislation, 111 Yale 
L.J. 1417, 1421 (2002) (stating that “[a]ll rapes necessarily contain an inherent 
gender animus”); Kathryn Carney, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 315, 319-20 (2001) (arguing that “the rape victim is selected because she 
possesses an immutable characteristic — her gender. . . . [r]ape is not an act of 
violence that simply happens to women — it is an act of hate that happens to women 
because they are women”); see also Eric Rothschild, Recognizing Another Face of Hate 
Crimes: Rape As a Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 231, 262-85 
(1993). 
 179 See generally Goldscheid, infra note 181 (evaluating the sources of evidence 
available to determine gender bias in hate crimes).  To evaluate this evidence would 
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Should, however, an increase in the number of refugees pose a 
realistic concern, the legislature, not asylum judges, should respond 
with measures that impact all categories of asylum applicants equally.  
Currently, in asylum cases brought on other grounds, such as 
persecution on account of a person’s race, the question of motive 
focuses primarily around the direct actions and words of the abuser, 
while societal information often serves only to provide additional 
context.180  The words of a persecutor are not more ambiguous 
merely because they contain gender slurs as opposed to racial slurs 
and because they are directed at a woman.181  The actions of an 
abuser that degrade or humiliate a person racially are not more 
instructive of motive than acts aimed to degrade a woman sexually.182  
In short, asylum adjudicators should not transform gender-based 
violence into a form of persecution that can only be understood and 
established if an applicant demonstrates a larger societal pattern of 
abuse and inequality.183  Allowing judges to turn a blind eye to 
valuable evidence of motive is not a fair solution to fears of opening 
the refugee floodgates and would deny women with significant 
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make accurate the INS’s otherwise unsupported statement that “[a]s in any asylum or 
withholding case, evidence about the persecutor’s statements and actions will be 
considered.”  See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 180 For example, in evaluating cases involving the persecution of Indo-Fijian 
people by ethnic Fijans the Ninth Circuit has found persecution on account of race 
in part by evaluating persecutors’ racially intolerant statements made during 
persecutory acts.  See, e.g., Gafoor v. I.N.S., 231 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
the persecutor’s statement that the applicant “should go back to India” compels the 
conclusion that he was persecuted at least in part because of race); Surita v. I.N.S., 95 
F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding racial motive where soldiers threatened 
applicant of Indian descent and robbed her more than a dozen times telling her they 
were looting her house because she was Indian and that she should return to India).  
The courts, however, viewed these statements against the backdrop of the 
tumultuous ethnic tension in Fiji documented by State Department country reports 
describing a recent coup by ethnic Fijans and their fierce discrimination against 
persons of Indian descent.  Surita, 95 F.3d at 817-18. 
 181 See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful 
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123, 132 (1999) (arguing 
prior to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the VAWA civil rights remedy that 
“courts can rely on the same types of evidence to assess gender-motivation in 
analyzing the presence of bias underlying violent crimes committed against women” 
as they routinely do to analyze bias in other harassment and violence cases). 
 182 See id. at 158.  Goldscheid, argues that “[a]n analysis of cases of domestic 
violence and sexual assault, as well as an analysis of other bias crime cases, reveals the 
circumstantial evidence of the bias that animates violent crimes committed against 
women just as it does in other types of bias crime cases.” 
 183 See generally Chisholm, supra note 124, at 452 (criticizing the emphasis in 
asylum law on whether the persecution is “societally important” for vesting 
oppressors with the power to define social groups). 
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motive evidence equal access to refuge.184 
C.  The Role of Societal Evidence 
It is important to note, however, that focusing on the nature of 
abuse in interpreting motive does not undercut the importance of 
understanding systemic power structures and societal norms in 
determining why abuse occurs.185  As Kasinga makes clear, societal 
evidence may be instrumental for asylum applicants when 
demonstrating both motive and a lack of state protection.186  In 
Kasinga, the BIA evaluated the motive of the would-be persecutors by 
considering the gender-specific nature of the FGM procedure, as well 
as its gender-specific purpose “to suppress and control the victim on 
account of her gender.”187  Thus, the INS rule properly notes that 
asylum judges may consider societal information when relevant, but 
ultimately fails by allowing it to supplant direct evidence within the 
discussion of the “on account of” requirement. 
Although the asylum analysis requires an evaluation of the 
protections from persecution available in a country from which a 
person seeks to escape,188 the question of whether an act rises to the 
level of persecution should not focus exclusively on legal measures 
condoning certain persecutory acts.189  As UNHCR has recently 
noted, “[e]ven though a particular state may have prohibited a 
persecutory practice . . . the state may nevertheless continue to 
condone or tolerate the practice, or may not be able to stop the 
practice.”190  Therefore, an evaluation of a state’s unwillingness or 
inability to protect a individual should consider not only a country’s 
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 184 See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), and discussion supra notes 
136-45. 
 185 See Chisholm, supra note 124, at 429-30 (arguing that “gender-based violence 
and persecution are supported by social institutions, which deliberately deny the 
voice of authority and credibility to oppressed groups”). 
 186 See, e.g., Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the 
prevalence of domestic and sexual violence in Mexico and its vastly underreported 
nature persuasive evidence of the Mexican government’s inability or unwillingness to 
control a father’s abusive behavior).  The court confronted evidence that over 13,000 
children living on Mexican streets were victimized by family members, that Mexican 
women are extremely reluctant to report abuse, and that police officials are reluctant 
to intervene in what society deems private matters.  Id. 
 187 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 188 See INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 189 See 2002 UN Gender Guidelines, supra note 12, at ¶ 11 (stating “that the fact that 
a law has been enacted to prohibit or denounce certain persecutory practices will 
therefore not in itself be sufficient to determine that the individual’s claim to 
refugee status is not valid”). 
 190 Id. 
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legal provisions, but also the reality of social practice.191 
D.  A Higher Burden to Establish Motive 
The question of whether rape and other forms of gender 
persecution are always persecution on account of one’s gender, as 
some scholars have argued192 and others have rejected,193 is beyond 
the scope of this Comment.  However, having discussed the 
appropriate sources of information to determine gender-based 
motive, this section addresses the circumstances in which an 
applicant can successfully present evidence of gender bias, but 
nevertheless would be unable to establish asylum under the proposed 
rule’s motive inquiry. 
In contravention of established BIA precedent and circuit court 
decisions,194 the proposed rule raises the evidentiary burden in the 
“on account of” analysis by requiring not only that an applicant 
establishes her persecutor’s motive, but also that she demonstrates, 
where a persecutor has mixed motivations, that her “protected 
characteristic is central to her persecutor’s motivation to act.”195  With 
respect to this heightened burden, commentary has convincingly 
noted a contradiction.196  First, the INS acknowledges that under BIA 
and federal court decisions, a persecutor acting “at least in part” 
because of a protected characteristic satisfies the “on account of” 
requirement.197  Then the rule proposes the “central” motivation 
analysis, a much tougher standard than the “at least in part” 
inquiry.198  While the INS offers no explanation for the contradiction, 
the context of the rule’s proposal may illuminate the INS’s decision 
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 191 See supra notes 188-90. 
 192 See Bonner, supra note 178; Carney supra note 178. 
 193 See generally Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward 
Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999). 
 194 See, e.g., Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (B.I.A. 1997) (stating “that 
an applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the 
past or is likely to occur in the future, [but must] produce evidence from which it is 
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or 
imputed protected ground”); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a Philippine asylum applicant demonstrated that a revolutionary group 
persecuted her at least in part on account of her political opinion while finding that 
economic extortion also motivated their actions). 
 195 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,598 (2000) 
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). 
 196 See Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural 
Hook” For Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1594-95 
(2001). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
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to heighten the motive inquiry. 
The INS proposed the mixed-motivation burden as part of the 
“R-A- rule,” a proposal touted by the INS as resolving issues prevalent 
in gender-based asylum claims.199  Technically, the proposed “R-A- 
rule’s” interpretation of the term “on account of” could apply equally 
to the motive inquiry in all kinds of asylum claims.200  However, 
because of the gendered context in which the INS has submitted its 
proposal,201 the higher burden has particular significance for women 
persecuted because they are women.  The central motive 
requirement indicates the INS’s skepticism of gender-bias as the 
primary motivation for abuse in gender persecution claims202 and 
thus necessitating additional safeguards in the asylum framework.203 
Whether, however, a person is persecuted because of his or her 
religion, race, or gender, asylum law does not protect victims of 
random crimes.204  The requirement that the injury be more 
significant than a random crime is already subsumed in the 
“persecution” element of the asylum statute, which must be 
established by all asylum applicants.205  By inserting the “central 
motivation” burden into the “on account of” discussion of the “R-A- 
rule,” the INS implies that gender persecution requires additional 
asylum safeguards because, in comparison to other forms of 
persecution, violence against women is harder to distinguish from 

 199 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588 (noting that the rule “establishes principles for 
interpretation and application of various components of the statutory definition of 
‘refugee’ . . . and, in particular will aid in the assessment of claims made by 
applicants who have suffered or fear domestic violence”). 
 200 The proposed rule merely provides a general definition for “on account of,” 
without limiting its application to gender-based claims.  See id. at 76,597. 
 201 See id. at 76,588. 
 202 Commentators have pointed out that the idea that gender-based asylum claims 
can be held to a higher standard than claims based on other grounds has been 
expressly rejected by the INS.  See, e.g., Caroline J. O’Neill, Comment, Health Is a 
Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response to Gender-Based Asylum Claims 
Requires More Attention to International Human Rights Norms, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 241, 272 (2000) (noting that the INS Guidelines reject the notion that 
gender-based claims are less valid than other asylum claims). 
 203 In the summary to the proposed rule the INS draws the distinction between 
patterns of abuse in a society and random acts of violence.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593. 
 204 Id. at 76,590. 
 205 As the INS states in the summary to the proposed rule, “[i]nherent in the 
meaning of persecution is the long-standing principle that the harm or suffering that 
an applicant experienced or fears must be inflicted by either the government of the 
country where the applicant fears persecution, or a person or group that government 
is unable to control.”  Id. (citing Matter of Villalta, 20 I & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 
1990)). 
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ordinary crimes outside the scope of asylum protection.206  Thus, the 
INS proposal again perpetuates a view of gender violence as 
occurring in the domestic sphere and lacking societal significance.207 
Even though domestic violence and rape may be rampant 
throughout the world, if the abuse rises to the level of harm required 
by the asylum statute and a state is unable or unwilling to protect the 
woman, then this abuse constitutes persecution, and should not be 
regarded as an ordinary crime.208  This does not mean that every 
woman who is the victim of rape or domestic violence and whose 
government fails to prevent the crime should gain asylum.209  It 
should mean, however, that a woman will meet the definition of a 
refugee if she establishes a well-founded fear of persecution by means 
of rape in a country where rape is socially acceptable and the 
government does nothing, or is impotent, to prevent and punish it.210  
For example, in Mexico, where the penalties for stealing a cow are 
harsher than the penalties for rape, the authorities rarely investigate 
rape.211  In fact, a legislator there has referred to the practice of 
abducting, raping, and then marrying women as “romantic.”212 
As noted earlier, the fact that state perpetrated violence against 
women should readily produce a finding of persecution should not 
conversely prevent the same finding for women from countries where 
laws may condemn certain practices in words, but unfettered abuse 
occurs as a matter of course.213  In Guatemala, for example, as noted 
by the BIA, “spouse abuse is recognized as a problem, and . . . some 
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 206 Commentators expressed this same fear in the context of the debate over the 
enactment of the VAWA civil rights remedy and over amending the federal hate 
crimes legislation to include gender bias.  See the discussion of objections in 
Goldscheid, supra note 181, at 126 n.15.  Goldscheid notes the ample evidentiary 
sources present in typical cases for determining gender bias and argues that the fact 
that women are often victimized by persons they know does not justify treating 
gender bias differently from other bias-motivated crimes.  Id. at 156. 
 207 See Thomas, supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also Love, supra note 
112. 
 208 See the discussion of FGM as persecution in In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 
365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
 209 The proposed rule recognizes this limitation of asylum within the context of its 
discussion of persecution.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592 (noting that “[o]f course, no 
government is able to guarantee the safety of each of its citizens at all times . . . this is 
not the standard for determining that a government is ‘unable or unwilling to 
control’ the infliction of harm or suffering”). 
 210 Compare with the racial persecution cases cited supra note 180, in which the 
courts correctly factored in evidence that the police flatly ignored applicants’ 
complaints of persecution. 
 211 Mary Jordan, In Mexico, An Unpunished Crime, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at A1. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
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measures have been pursued in an attempt to respond to this 
acknowledged problem.”214  In spite of these measures, however, the 
Guatemalan authorities “did not take further action” when Alvarado’s 
husband ignored three police citations and continued to abuse his 
wife.215  Acknowledging the complete failure of Guatemala to protect 
Alvarado, the BIA nevertheless denied her asylum claim, unwilling to 
find persecution in light of the country’s alleged remedial efforts.216  
Unfortunately, the BIA’s reasoning adopts form over reality in the 
analysis of persecution.  Regardless of affirmative measures to address 
spousal abuse in Guatemala, because of the unwillingness of the 
authorities to protect Alvarado, her chances of leading a life free of 
abuse were arguably no better in Guatemala than if she had lived in 
Nigeria, a country with certain regional laws that expressly permit 
husbands to abuse their wives.217  Therefore, in sorting out whether 
asylum applicants have a well-founded fear of persecution as opposed 
to fear of random crime, the focus of asylum adjudication should be 
the reality of country conditions as opposed to legal formality.218 
E.  Inviting Disparate Treatment of Sexual Violence Claims 
Even in an obvious case of state sanctioned abuse, under the 
central motivation standard proposed by the rule, a judge could deny 
asylum to a woman victimized by sexual violence, who otherwise 
meets the requirements of asylum based on the “on account of” 
element of her case.  Under the INS proposal, a judge could 
potentially find that sexual desire was the primary motive, looking 
past a persecutor’s attitudes about women supported by the country’s 
archaic laws or sexist culture.219  This threatens to create a different 
standard of treatment for women’s persecution, a possibility 
previously rejected by scholars and the INS itself.220 
Unlike persecution inflicted against persons because of their 
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 214 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 922 (B.I.A. 1999) 
 215 Id. at 909. 
 216 Id. at 922. 
 217 See Words and Deeds: Holding Governments Accountable in the Beijing +5 Review 
Process, EQUALITY NOW 28 (Jul. 1999) (citing the Penal Code of Northern Nigeria, 
Section 55. Correction of Child, Pupil, Servant or Wife) (on file with author). 
 218 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
 219 For a criticism of the skepticism or differential treatment of gender bias as 
opposed to racial or religious bias, see Goldscheid, supra note 181. 
 220 See O’Neill, supra note 202; see also U.S. Guidelines supra note 32, at 9 (stating 
that the analysis for gender-based claims should be the same as other claims under 
the current framework and that the “appearance of sexual violence in a claim should 
not lead adjudicators to conclude automatically that the claim is an instance of 
purely personal harm”). 
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race or religion, gender-based persecution is often sexual in nature221 
and inflicted by persons known to the victim.222  As one scholar has 
noted in a critique of state hate crimes legislation, “this fact 
necessarily gives rise to highly complicated mixed-motive inquiries 
that are largely absent from typical hate crimes directed against 
blacks, Jews, or other targeted groups where the attacker is often 
unknown to the defendant.”223  Because of the greater opportunity 
for gender-based asylum claims to elicit a mixed-motive inquiry,224 
women’s claims may more frequently trigger the proposed “central” 
motivation requirement.  Thus, the rule increases the potential for 
differing treatment of women’s claims: In the context of gender-
persecution the central motive may habitually be attributed to sexual 
desire or personal circumstances, rather than gender-animus, due to 
the fact that violence against women is frequently sexual in nature 
and is often deemed to occur in the domestic sphere.225  In 
comparison, because men’s claims do not fall disproportionately in 
the realm of sexual and personal violence, their claims will not 
trigger the higher burden as frequently.  This disparity is problematic 
on two levels.  First, conceptually, it reveals the INS’s skeptical view of 
gender-based violence as animus toward a group, thus perpetuating 
stereotypes of women’s experiences as personal and irrelevant.226  
Second, pragmatically, it gives judges a tool, indeed a veritable signal, 
to continue to discount women’s gender-based claims.227 
When the abuse at issue is not sexual in nature, the rule still 
poses troubling barriers for women.  The added “central motivation” 
limitation gives judges substantial discretion to interpret motivation 
even when the nature of abuse indicates a strong gender bias.228  For 
example, a judge could find that the persecutor acted violently not 
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 221 See generally Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance 
with Commission On Human Rights Resolution 1995/85, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 
(Feb. 5, 1996) [hereinafter “Special Rapporteur’s Violence Against Women Report”]. 
 222 See Bonner, supra note 178, at 1439. 
 223 See id. 
 224 See id. 
 225 See id; see also Thomas, supra note 112. 
 226 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 227 For a discussion of the historical view of domestic violence as personal and 
unworthy of asylum protection, see Anker, supra note 82. 
 228 Essentially, the modification allows for a repeat of the BIA’s superficial and 
rigid interpretation of motive.  See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 921 (B.I.A. 1999) 
(stating that Alvarado’s husband harmed her “for not getting an abortion, for his 
belief that she was seeing other men, for not having her family get money for him, 
for not being able to find something in the house, for leaving a cantina before him, 
for reasons related to his mistreatment in the army, and ‘for no reason at all’”). 
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because of an animus toward a particular group but primarily 
because he is a generally violent person.229  Moreover, a judge could 
easily find that any ephemeral stimulus, such as jealousy230 or 
revenge,231 motivated the act.  In contrast to the approach advocated 
by the proposed rule, courts have previously found persecution on 
account of a protected characteristic even in cases where the facts 
suggested that a generic emotion or stimulus was a primary 
motivation.232  As the INS has noted previously, gender-based claims 
are entitled to comparable treatment in the asylum analysis.233 
In the absence of an “at least in part” motive analysis, the 
heightened requirement of proving motivation encourages more 
erroneous decisions in domestic violence cases, such as In re G-R-.234  
In this case, the judge denied asylum to a woman from El Salvador 
based on his determination that her husband did not harm her 
because of her “membership in a particular social group,” defined as 
“women who refuse to submit to and leave their batterers.”235  
According to the judge, the abuse, which involved severe beatings, 
strangulation, and sexual assault that occurred in front of her 
daughter, “was a personal problem.”236  Calling the husband 
paranoid, the judge stated the following: 
[H]er ex-husband . . . is not after her because she is an abused 
woman or because she shares some characteristic with any other 
women, but simply because she is the respondent, the woman he 
believed to be his woman, and that he feels he has the right to 
abuse, and the right to punish because she left him.237 
Deeming this motivation beyond the reach of asylum protection, the 
immigration judge in this case failed to recognize, or even to 
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 229 See id. at 926 (crediting the husband’s motivation as “simple unchecked 
violence tied to the inherent meanness of his personality”); see also Melgar de Torres, 
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding rape by Salvadoran guerillas was a random 
act of violence). 
 230 See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 926. 
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consider, how the husband’s view of women formed the basis for his 
treatment and attitude toward his wife.238 
Similarly, the BIA in In re R-A- failed to consider how the 
husband’s view of women affected his actions.  Although the BIA 
noted in its discussion of Alvarado’s political opinion claim that “the 
respondent’s account of what her husband told her may well reflect 
his own view of women and, in particular his view of the respondent 
as his property to do with as he pleased,” the BIA shockingly did not 
find this conclusion relevant to the “on account of” discussion of 
Alvarado’s “particular social group” claim.239  Both judges’ failure to 
evaluate this connection in In re G-R-  and in In re R-A-abrogated the 
fundamental charge of the asylum adjudicator in applying the “on 
account of’” analysis: to evaluate whether the persecutor inflicts harm 
on the victim in order to punish her for having a protected 
characteristic.240 
The proposed rule facilitates more superficial motive analyses by 
giving judges room to credit paranoia or a controlling personality as 
the primary motivation for an abuser’s acts instead of acknowledging 
the underlying reasons for why gender persecution occurs.  The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women has found that 
domestic violence is the result of a desire “to punish, humiliate, and 
exercise power over the victim on account of her gender.”241  
Following the proposed rule, however, judges would fail to scrutinize 
this information and its applicability to a given case.  Unlike the 
analysis of other traditional asylum claims, such as torture based on 
political opinion which may have both a specific purpose (to elicit 
information through harm) and a broader purpose (to intimidate or 
punish a group), the rule encourages judges not to take account of 
the deeper impulses at work.242  Against the backdrop of the historical 
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 240 See INS Guidelines, supra note 32, at 10 (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
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 241 See Anker, supra note 78, at 741 (citing Special Rapporteur’s Violence Against 
Women Report, 1995/85, at 7 ¶¶ 23, 14, 53 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53). 
 242 The potential for the unjustified unequal treatment of the motive inquiry with 
respect to gender persecution claims is illustrated by the UN Special Rapporteur’s 
discussion of the similarities between torture and domestic violence.  See Special 
Rapporteur’s Violence Against Women Report, supra note 221, at ¶¶ 42-44.  Urging 
states to abandon views of domestic violence as occurring for personal reasons, the 
report states that like torture, domestic violence may be committed for specific 
purposes such as “eliciting information, punishment, [and] intimidation” but also 
like torture, the persecutor has broader motives.  Id. at ¶ 44.  He acts “to obliterate 
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view of gender violence as private acts,243 the “central motivation” 
standard invites asylum adjudicators to continue to skim the surface 
in the analysis of motive. 
Furthermore, the change increases the already nebulous burden 
on asylum claimants to prove their persecutor’s motive.244  It requires 
her to delve further into her persecutor’s psyche, sort out, and prove 
what is and is not central to his motivation to act against her.245  In 
the absence of a sound legal justification for this higher evidentiary 
burden, which the rule’s commentary does not provide,246 the 
proposed rule arbitrarily makes it more difficult for women who are 
victims of gender persecution to establish a nexus between the 
persecution they suffered and a protected characteristic.247  Thus, the 
rule fails to transform the asylum process for gender-based claims and 
continues to disregard the experience of women in refugee law.248 
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F.  Membership In A Particular Social Group 
In attempting to resolve the conflicting interpretations of 
“membership in a particular social group,”249 the proposed rule 
requires the presence of a “common, immutable” trait as a threshold 
element of a social group.250  Although the INS commentary to the 
proposed rule states, “gender is clearly such an immutable trait . . . 
and is incorporated in this rule,”251 the INS proposal suggests that an 
applicant who establishes that she has been persecuted based on an 
immutable trait, such as gender, may nevertheless fail to meet the 
definition of a refugee. 
Establishing persecution based on the immutable trait of gender 
may not be enough under the proposed rule because the INS sets 
forth six additional factors, which “may be considered in determining 
whether a particular social group exists.”252  As one scholar has 
pointed out, the presence of these additional factors creates a two-
tiered analysis.253  First, a “social group” must consist of members with 
a common, immutable characteristic.254  Having found an immutable 
trait, a judge may then consider the extent to which the group is a 
cohesive and societally-recognized group.255 
The rule proposes that asylum adjudicators evaluate this second 
prong by considering six flexible factors.256  According to the rule’s 
commentary, the first three factors essentially constitute a “voluntary 
associational test” which incorporates the definition of “social group” 
established by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez-
Montiel v. INS. 257  The commentary asserts that Hernandez-Montiel 
restated the Ninth Circuit’s formulation of a social group as “a 
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are 
actuated by some common impulse or interest.”258 
In contrast, however, to the INS’s conjunctive interpretation of 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the Hernandez-Montiel decision can be 
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logically read as setting forth the immutability requirement and the 
voluntary associational inquiry as disjunctive tests.259  The court’s use 
of the word “or” in the plain language of the decision supports this 
interpretation.260  The Ninth Circuit stated that “‘a particular social 
group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former 
association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to 
the identities or consciences of its members that members either 
cannot or should not be required to change it.”261 
In addition, the UN’s refugee agency has endorsed the Ninth 
Circuit approach.  In recently released guidelines on the 
interpretation of the “membership in a particular social group” 
category, UNHCR has suggested that under the Refugee Convention, 
social groups may consist of persons sharing an immutable trait or of 
persons sharing mutable, but societally recognized characteristics.262  
Acknowledging that “analyses under the two approaches may 
frequently converge” when persons targeted because of an immutable 
trait are also perceived as social groups within their particular 
societies, the guidelines suggest that the Refugee Convention does 
not require that the analysis be conflated.263  In fact, the guidelines 
explain that “at times the approaches may reach different results”264 
and a social group may exist even if its members do not share an 
immutable characteristic.265 
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 263 Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at ¶ 13. 
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Unlike the approach advocated by UNHCR, the INS’s proposed 
convergence of the Ninth Circuit’s disjunctive tests into a two-prong 
analysis makes the “membership in a particular social group” 
category the most difficult of the five grounds for which a person can 
seek asylum.266  As renowned international refugee law scholar Atle 
Grahl-Madsen has noted, the categories of persecution in the 
Refugee Convention’s definition of refugee can be divided into two 
groups—those that represent characteristics beyond a person’s 
control and those that represent voluntary characteristics.267  In other 
words, an applicant can establish asylum based on persecution 
because of an immutable characteristic (as in the case of race, 
nationality, and “in certain respects” religion268), or based on 
persecution because of a voluntary, defining characteristic akin to the 
voluntary associational test discussed in Hernandez-Montiel (as in the 
case of political opinion).269  Grahl-Madsen considered “membership 
in a particular social group” to belong in the former “immutable” 
category;270 while some jurisdictions have suggested that “social 
groups” may reflect only voluntary conduct or associational status.271  
Because of its proposed conjunctive test, the rule suggests that to 
establish “membership in a particular social group,” an applicant 
must establish both.  Thus, persecution on account of an immutable 
characteristic, particularly when that characteristic is gender, may not 
qualify a persecuted person as a refugee under either classification of 
protected status identified by Grahl-Madsen.272  Consistent with the 
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paradox faced by victims of gender-persecution, the conjunctive 
approach leaves women stranded, their claims incompatible with any 
of the categories of protection afforded to persons by refugee law.273 
For example, because of the discretion vested in judges to 
consider the other factors, it is questionable whether the outcome of 
Rodi Alvarado’s case before the BIA would be any different under the 
proposed rule.274  Even if Rodi Alvarado’s claimed group, 
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with 
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live 
under male domination,”275 could meet the immutability 
requirement, the additional factors could provide a basis for an 
immigration judge to reach the same appalling result.  In fact, a 
judge could find that Rodi Alvarado’s claimed social group does not 
meet several of the listed factors. 
First, a judge could find that members of the group are not 
closely affiliated with each other because women experience the 
persecution individually and may not view their opposition to abuse 
by their male companions as placing them in a larger societal 
group.276  Second, the BIA could view the group as not driven by a 
common motive or interest if it deems each member’s objection to 
the violence as a concern for her personal autonomy and safety, 
rather than as an interest in the larger social problem of male 
domination and abuse.  The “common motive or interest” thus comes 
close to requiring that members of a social group espouse a shared 
political opinion—a suggestion that not only imposes a double 
burden on certain applicants to meet standards embodied in more 
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than one asylum ground, but also unfairly suggests that women’s 
objection to their personal domination at the hands of men is 
inconsequential unless they champion the rights of all women.277  
Third, a judge could find that the group is not viewed as a societal 
faction or otherwise recognized segment of the population if the 
persecution of women is so rampant in a society that a judge deems 
abused women too numerous to constitute a discrete group.278  
Similarly, a judge could find that oppressed women are not set apart 
for distinct treatment from other members of society because the 
violence directed at women as a class may be viewed from a culturally 
elitist perspective as a collateral consequence of generally poor 
country conditions rather than as human rights violations worthy of 
an international response.279  This is a substantial possibility 
considering the emphasis on discretely defined social groups that 
transcend country-wide strife in asylum law precedents.280 
For example, in Fatin v. INS,281 the Third Circuit stated that an 
Iranian woman did not establish persecution on account of a 
particular social group because, in the court’s view, her persecution 
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was indistinguishable from the generalized restrictions imposed on 
the entire population of Iranian women.282  Particularly in an anti-
immigration climate, which arguably describes the United States after 
September 11th,283 asylum judges may follow the reasoning of Fatin 
and view social groups reflective of broad oppression in foreign 
countries skeptically even if claimants otherwise meet the elements 
required for refugee status.284 
In conclusion, under the proposed INS rule, whether gender by 
itself may actually be considered a “social group” without reference to 
the group’s other defining characteristics remains unfortunately 
unclear.285  The discretionary factors that allow immigration judges to 
consider whether a group defined by gender has sufficient societal 
significance can easily negate the impact of the INS’s declaration that 
gender is an immutable trait which may constitute a particular social 
group.286  This is extremely problematic in light of the continued 
breadth of human rights abuses perpetrated against entire societies 
of women287 and by the UN’s position that persecution based on 
gender warrants refugee protection.288  Not only does the rule insert 
new hurdles into the asylum process for victims of gender 
persecution, it adds to a history of piecemeal efforts, such as the 1995 
INS Guidelines and the Kasinga decision, which have failed to 
revolutionize the treatment of gender-persecution under the 
statute.289  In short, the rule’s flaws indicate a problem larger than the 
R-A- decision: they demonstrate a fundamental gap in the asylum law 
framework. 
IV.  THE GENDER PARADOX – A SIXTH CATEGORY IS NEEDED 
Throughout the past decade, refugee activists and immigration 
lawyers have advocated for greater protection for victims of gender 
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persecution in asylum law largely through litigation and arguments 
for regulatory reform—not through legislation.290 Because of the lack 
of a gender category in the Refugee Convention’s definition of a 
refugee, advocates representing the immediate interests of 
persecuted women have had no other option but to frame their 
asylum cases within one of the current categories.291  However, in 
fighting the necessary battle to ensure women’s protection within the 
current framework, the focus of advocates may have eclipsed the 
asylum system’s bigger flaw—the unjustified exclusion of victims of 
gender-persecution from the Refugee Act’s categorical grounds for 
asylum. 
The patriarchal system firmly in place at the time of the Refugee 
Convention’s enactment is largely responsible for women’s 
definitional exclusion from the protection afforded to refugees by 
the international community.292  The inconsistent applications and 
restrictive interpretations of the current asylum categories, however, 
are a product of more than a limited definition; they may also be 
attributable to society’s enduring patriarchal views of women and 
their experiences.293  Amending the refugee definition to include 
gender persecution as an independent ground of asylum would not 
only provide victims of gender-persecution a better legal framework, 
it would send a definitive message to asylum adjudicators that 
violence against women is internationally relevant. 
Noted refugee scholar Deborah Anker has argued that adding a 
separate category of gender-based persecution to the asylum 
framework would be futile because the historical exclusion of women 
from asylum protection is the result of “incomplete and gendered 
interpretation of refugee law.”294  According to Anker, “[s]imply 
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adding gender or sex to the enumerated grounds of persecution 
would not solve this problem.”295  In spite of this prediction, Anker 
has an optimistic view of modern refugee law,296 specifically of its 
capacity to “take an integrative perspective on women’s rights” within 
the current framework.297 
While some strides have been made in recognizing women’s 
rights within asylum law,298 Anker’s analysis underestimates the effect 
an amendment to the Refugee Act could have in combating the 
gender paradox that remains.  A category of gender-persecution 
would afford persecuted women an opportunity to avoid traditional 
definitional barriers, such as the conception of “social group” as 
discretely defined, which in spite of Anker’s optimism, persists as a 
barrier for women.299  In addition, amending the definition would 
likely have a psychological impact on asylum adjudicators as well; it 
would communicate the seriousness of their obligation to look 
beneath the surface and analyze the motive for persecution in 
women’s claims.300  Most importantly, a separate category would 
resolve the forced reliance on the “social group” category for the 
assertion of two distinct kinds of gender-based claims, which poses 
both substantive and conceptual problems. 
The “social group” category must encompass claims in which the 
persecution at issue “is on account of” the woman’s immutable 
characteristic of gender, essentially gender-motivated crimes, such as 
FGM and rape where the woman is selected for violence precisely 
because of her gender.301  In addition, this ground must also serve as 
the basis for claims where women are persecuted because of 
particular actions or beliefs, such as feminist activism or transgressing 
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social mores.302  The “membership in a particular social group” and 
“political opinion” categories may appropriately apply to women’s 
claims when the motivation for persecution is specific to the woman’s 
conduct, not status, and may therefore meet adjudicators’ 
requirements that the social group be discretely defined.303  However, 
to treat women’s claims asserting persecution on account of their 
gender under the same “social group” ground minimizes the 
difference — as Andrea Binder puts it — between women being 
persecuted “as women” and women suffering human rights abuses 
“because they are women.”304  While certain fortunate female asylum 
applicants and their lawyers may continue to fit or creatively squeeze 
claims into the current categories, Anker’s description of refugee law 
as “integrative” will never be fully realized until gender-motivated 
persecution is no longer an asylum paradox requiring refugee lawyers 
to proceed with the utmost imagination. 
Furthermore, the many gender-based asylum cases in which 
applicants have had to rely on the “political opinion” ground to 
establish cognizable persecution undermines the principle that 
victimizing women on account of their gender is a violation of human 
rights.305  Although this ground of seeking asylum has proved 
successful for some victims of gender persecution who could not 
otherwise establish asylum, its suggestion that objection to this 
treatment is merely a “political belief” shared by a faction is not in 
accordance with the international community’s condemnation of 
violence against women as a violation of human rights.306  While a 
woman’s belief in equality may in a few narrow circumstances 
appropriately be viewed as a political opinion,307 a woman’s general 
objection to torture and to the denial of basic human rights should 
not be considered political, nor extraordinary.308 
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The contradictory conception of gender persecution claims by 
asylum adjudicators as either too broad or too narrow to warrant 
refugee status, complicates the burden on women to squeeze distinct 
types of claims within the available grounds of asylum.  On one end 
of the spectrum are cases like Fatin,309 and Safie v. INS,310 which 
denied asylum to applicants based on a conception of “social groups” 
as discretely defined and of the gender oppression in Iran as too 
widespread for the purposes of asylum.311  In contrast, in cases like R-
A-, judges have viewed gender violence as too private and 
particularized to constitute persecution based on the characteristics 
of a social group that transcend the individual victim.312  The “R-A- 
rule” fits within the latter vision of gender persecution because of its 
requirement that the abuse be societally relevant.313  These 
conflicting restrictions on gender-based asylum claims have created a 
troubling paradox: a tension between competing demands on 
gender-based claims which leaves women with only narrow 
opportunities to gain refuge.314 
Furthermore, the paradox faced by women is unique.315  
Concern over the size of the group sharing the protected 
characteristic has generally not been a barrier for persons persecuted 
on account of their race or religion.316  In fact, widespread oppression 
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— specifically the genocide perpetrated against Jews — was precisely 
the kind of persecution that compelled the creation of the Refugee 
Convention.317  It is true that persecution based on race and religion 
has generally tended to affect discrete religious and ethnic 
minorities, groups that are significantly smaller in scale than the 
general category of women.318  The asylum statute, however, does not 
include the specific names of each ethnic or religious group as a 
protected class in the asylum statute.319  Instead, it protects all of 
these groups as a whole, linking them through the general reason for 
their persecution, for example, their race or religion, without regard 
to the number of persons  afflicted collectively within each category 
of persecution.320 
Similarly, while women from different cultures may experience 
gender-persecution differently, they are linked by the common 
reason for their persecution: their sex.  The frequency of a 
motivation — that occurs globally and cross-culturally — for 
persecuting certain refugees should not exclude an applicant from 
gaining asylum.321  While women collectively constitute a broad 
category of persons, gender as a descriptive characteristic of motive is 
no broader than race or religion.322  Accordingly, Congress should act 
to honor the United States’ international obligation323 to protect all 
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refugees by amending the asylum statute.324 
Congress did not hesitate to expand the refugee definition 
through legislation when it conflicted with values important to 
Congress in the past.  For example, reproductive politics galvanized 
conservative members of Congress to amend the Refugee Act in 1996 
to include forced sterilization and coercive family planning within the 
definition of persecution.325  Having recognized the occurrence of 
gender apartheid in Afghanistan — a country to whom the United 
States has pledged support for women rebuilding their lives326 — it is 
a fitting moment for Congress to fully integrate women’s experiences 
within refugee law.  To amend the Refugee Act would not only signal 
a shift in the paradoxical history of women’s gender-based asylum 
claims, it would achieve an overdue recognition that “women do have 
a legitimate claim to human rights and fundamental freedoms due 
them as women.”327 
The primary argument raised against amending the Refugee Act 
to add a gender category is the concern that it would open the 
floodgates to asylum claims and inundate the United States with 
refugees.328  The historical and present reality of women’s limited 
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means to escape from persecution, however, does not support this 
fear.329  The experience of countries such as Canada are instructive; it 
did not experience a surge in refugees after recognizing persecution 
based on gender without regard to other social group 
characteristics.330  In addition, as this critique of the “R-A- rule” has 
addressed, the asylum framework already provides substantial 
safeguards against a potential flood of refugees.331  The burden of 
presenting sufficient evidence of a persecutor’s motive and the 
requirement that a country be unable or unwilling to protect an 
applicant from persecution, remain substantial hurdles for any 
asylum applicant.332 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Asylum law’s gender paradox evolved out of a 50-year-old treaty 
that ignored the needs of women and the realities of their 
experience. 333  The paradox has grown under adjudication reflecting 
enduring stereotypes about why women are tortured and abused.  
The assumptions underlying the proposed “R-A- rule” are a product 
of the paradox as well.334  Until a fundamental change is made to the 
asylum framework, a change that will send a definitive message to 
asylum adjudicators that they must treat gender bias as they do other 
forms of persecution, the inconsistencies will likely continue without 
restraint.  While Anker is right that it may be impossible to 
completely prevent stereotypes of women’s experiences from 
permeating asylum claims,335 under an amended Refugee Act, the 
paradoxical treatment of women’s persecution would no longer be 
exacerbated by limited definitions and their concomitant messages 
about the relevancy of women’s experiences. 
Until then, the essence of the gender paradox may be larger 
than competing legal demands placed on gender-based claims.  The 
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true irony may be that refugees who are some of the most tortured 
and the most in need of protection may be turned away.  While the 
“R-A- rule” awaits action by the Bush Administration, Rodi Alvarado 
continues to wait, as well.336  She has now been in the United States 
for seven years, cleaning houses, thinking about her two children 
whom she was forced to leave with relatives in Guatemala, and waiting 
to hear if she can remain within the safety of the country to which she 
bravely escaped.337 
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